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DUE PROCESS AND THE INDEPENDENT
MEDICAL EXAMINER SYSTEM IN THE
MAINE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Workers' compensation became front page news during the summer of 1991, when Maine's governor refused to sign the state's
budget unless the Legislature reformed the system.1 Although the
vehemence of the governor's demands stunned both the public and
the Legislature, the dire state of workers' compensation was well

known to those involved.2 In fact, the Legislature has debated reforming the system nearly every year,- and sixteen significant
4
changes have been made since the program's inception in 1915.
In 1991, the Legislature focused on cutting costs. The system requires two types of highly paid professionals-doctors and lawyers.
Therefore, an obvious way to reduce system costs is to reduce the
involvement of these expensive people. The Legislature wanted a
system where medical decisions would be made by medical practitioners.' They hoped to discourage doctor shopping, foster more ob1. See, e.g., Nancy Perry, Budget: Who Will Blink First?, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 2, 1991, at 1A ("Gov. John R. McKernan's decision to shut down state
government in an attempt to force workers' compensation reforms is a high-risk strategy .... ).
2. See REPORT OF THE GovEA NOR's TASK FORCE ON WORKERS'COMPENSATION, Apr.
1991; AFL-CIO, WORKPLACE INJURIES & WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN MAINE, May 29,
1991; WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFoRM CoMIrrTEE, Joas. THE ECONOMY AND WOaERS' COMPENSATION [hereinafter "WCRC"], Jan. 10, 1991; WORKERS' COMPENSATION
RESEARCH INSTrrUTE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN MAINE, Dec. 1990 [hereinafter
"WCRI"].
3. In the last nine years, for example, the Workers' Compensation Act has been
entirely reworked four times. S. Peter Mills, Update on Workers' Compensation,
MTLA NEws (Me. Trial Lawyers Ass'n), Jan. 1992, at 3.
4. See FREDEmCK H. GREENE E, THE WoRKERs' COMPENSATION '91 AMNDMENTS:
A PATHWAY THROUGH THE MAZE (counting fifteen major changes). By adopting the
plai prepared by the Blue Ribbon Commission, the legislature has once again entirely rewritten the workers' compensation laws, bringing the number of substantial
revisions to sixteen. P.L. 1991, ch. 885 (Act effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 39-A, §§ 101-314).
5. GovERNo's TASK FORCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM, REPORT 22
(1991) [hereinafter GOvERNOR'S TASK FORCE] ("[T]here is tremendous attorney involvement in Maine's comp system with the expected resulting litigation... there is
heavy involvement of health care providers and considerable surgery .... All of
these factors drive costs up and overload the system with cases and procedures that
clog it and create delays.")
6. WCRC, supra note 2, at 11.
7. An Act to Improve the Maine Workers' Compensation System: Hearings on
L.D. 1594 Before the Joint Standing Comm'n on Labor, Banking and Ins., (1991)
(testimony of Edward David, M.D., J.D.).
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jective and consistent decisions," and generally streamline the dispute resolution process.9
Toward this end, the Legislature enacted a statute that radically
alters the process for determining the validity and value of a claim.
The new system employs independent medical examiners (IMEs) to
render all medical findings necessary "in any dispute relating to the
medical condition of a claimant."'" On its face, this concept may not
seem so extraordinary. 1 The new law, however, also provides that
"the board shall adopt the medical findings of the independent medical examiner unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary in the record that does not support the medical findings.""
This arrangement effectively relegates the workers' compensation
hearing officers to the role of appellate judges, reviewing IME decisions under a clear error standard. Unfortunately, this revised process may not save the state any money at all. 13 It may also be
unconstitutional.
This Comment will focus on whether the independent medical examiner system satisfies the requirements of due process. 1 4 The first
8. Memorandum from Ralph L. Tucker, Chairman of Workers' Compensation
Comm'n to the Joint Standing Comm'n on Labor, Banking and Ins., 3 (May 29, 1991)
(on file with author) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM]; WCRI, supra note 2, at 88-89.
9. WCRI, supra note 2, at 86.
10. P.L. 1991, ch. 885 (Act effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Mv. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(3)).
11. After all, IMEs have been used in Maine's workers' compensation system for
years. See R.S. ch. 31, § 22 (1954).
12. P.L. 1991, ch. 885 (effective Oct. 7, 1992 (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 39-A, § 312(7)). In fact, the law provides that if the parties agree to a particular
IME, then the findings are binding. Id.
13. As the Chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission, Ralph Tucker,
pointed out:
The cost of setting up and regulating a statewide system of coordinated
state medical examiners would be substantial, particularly because the use
of medical panels would be mandatory, even where the issue is minor or
sufficient medical evidence already exists.
The assignment and scheduling of evaluations, together with the necessary gathering of medical information and distribution of reports, will be a
tremendous task. Basically, we would be transferring onto the state the coordination of all the medical evaluation work which is currently performed
directly between insurers and their networks of medical evaluators.
Disability Determination Services estimates they would need 50 new positions and $2.9 million to take over evaluations. This may be low.
MEMORANDUM, supra note 8, at 2.
14. Anytime a lawyer (or prospective lawyer) cries out for more due process, she
may expect skepticism. Popular cynicism has long viewed the lawyer as being concerned primarily with her wallet:
The one great principle of the English law is, to make business for itself.
There is no other principle distinctly, certainly, and consistently maintained through all its narrow turnings. Viewed by this light it becomes a
coherent scheme, and not the monstrous maze the laity are apt to think it.
Let them but once clearly perceive that its grand principle is to make busi-
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section provides a brief description of the statute itself. The next
several sections offer a quick tour of the essentials of due process in
the administrative context. Finally, this Comment will offer an analytical framework for judging the constitutionality of the IME program. The analysis will break the IME system into three separate
phases-investigator, witness, and fact-finder. By separating the
IME system into these three components, this Comment will clarify
the constitutional issues raised by the system, and offer suggestions
to keep the program within the bounds of due process.

IL THE

STATUTE15

The independent medical examiner system creates a new dispute
resolution process." The IMEs will be responsible for deciding medical issues "in any dispute relating to the medical condition of the
claimant."'" They will be selected and supervised by the Workers'
ness for itself at their expense, and surely they will cease to grumble.
CMUALEs DICKENS, BLFAK HOUSE 509 (Bantam Books 1989) (1853). The Author, of
course, wrote this Comment with a pure heart and altruistic intentions.
15. Originally, the Legislature introduced the new IME system as part of the reforms enacted in 1991. ME_. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 92-B (West 1992). The new
legislation left the program substantially intact.
Section 312 substantially enacts the provisions of former Title 39, section
92-B on independent medical examiners, except the board is given the responsibilities the medical coordinator had under Title 39. In addition, section 312 requires the board to create a list of no more than 50 of the State's
most highly qualified and highly experienced health care providers to serve
as independent medical examiners and the board must periodically validate
the list. The disqualification from service of a person who has treated an
employee at the request of an employer or insurer is expanded to include
the request of an employee. The board must assign an independent medical
examiner if the parties to a dispute can not agree on a medical examiner of
their own choosing. Section 312 states that, if the parties have agreed to the
independent medical examiner they are bound by the examiner's findings.
If the board assigned the independent medical examiner, the board is required to adopt the findings unless there is clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary in the record that does not support the findings.
L.D. 2464, Statement of Fact (115th Legis., 3d Spec. Sess., 1992).
16. The statute discussed in this Comment was originally enacted by P.L. 1991,
ch. 615, § D-19 (effective Oct. 17, 1991). The Legislature mistakenly enacted two sections designated 92-A; the other is titled "Assessment on workers' compensation insurers and self-insured employers," and was enacted by P.L. 1991, ch. 591, § AA-3
(effective July 17, 1991). Revisor's Report 1991, c. 1 §§ 59, 60 changed the [IE section to 92-B.
17. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Ma Rv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, §§ 101-314). Specifically, § 312(3) assigns responsibility to the
IMEs to "render medical findings in any dispute relating to the medical condition of
a claimant, including but not limited to disputes that involve the employee's medical
condition, improvement or treatment, degree of impairment, or ability to return to
work."

Since medical findings in workers' compensation often blend with non-medical decisions, there may be concern that IIEs will in fact be deciding too much. Determin-
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Compensation Board of Maine.18 Although the hearing officers will
continue to make the ultimate decisions, the statute creates an extraordinary role for the IME.19 In combination, the weight accorded
the IME's findings and the process by which the IME gathers her
evidence create a system under which the IME's decision is essentially unchallengeable.
An IME's findings receive extraordinary weight. If the parties
agree to a particular IME, her findings are binding."0 If the parties
cannot agree and the Board must appoint an IME, then the Board
must accept her findings unless clear and convincing evidence indicates that she is mistaken.2 1 Perhaps most important, when reviewing an IME's findings, the Board may not evaluate evidence not con22
sidered by the IME.
ing incapacity for work, for example, includes evaluating the job market in the
worker's community. See, e.g., Warren v. Vinalhaven Light & Power Co., 424 A.2d
711, 713 (Me. 1981). A worker's post-injury earnings or her attempts to find work
may also affect the ultimate decision. See, e.g., McLellan v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 444
A.2d 427, 430 (Me. 1982); Comparetto v. Diaz Corp., 431 A.2d 1326, 1329 (Me. 1981);
Mitchell v. City of Bangor, 385 A.2d 210 (Me. 1978). Although such considerations do
not directly affect the constitutionality of the statute, they do raise questions about
the wisdom of the program. Indirectly, they affect the potential value of additional
safeguards.
18. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(1)). Section 312(1) specifically directs the Board to create
and maintain a list of not more than fifty IMEs and to adopt fee schedules and other
regulations. Id. The Maine Workers' Compensation Board is a newly created entity as
well. Id. § 151. Originally, the IME system was entrusted to the Medical Coordinator,
whose position was specially created for that purpose. ME. REV.STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§
92-B, 121 (West Supp. 1991). It appears that the new Act eliminates the Medical
Coordinator's position.
19. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. RE.
STAT. ANN.

tit. 39-A, § 312(7)).

20. Id.
21. Id. The original IME statute provided that the IME's findings would be
adopted by the commissioner unless a preponderance of the evidence indicated that
she was wrong. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 92-B(7) (West Supp. 1991). The duties
performed by "commissioners" under the old Act will now be handled by "hearing
officers." P.L. 1991, ch. 885 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 39-A, § 152(5)). It is unclear whether the Board must appoint an IME if
neither party requests one. Earlier IME provisions applied only when a party requested an IME examination. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 65 (1989); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 39, §§ 52-D(2) & 92-B(3) (West Supp. 1991). The new statute, however,
provides that "[a]n independent medical examiner shall render medical findings on
the medical condition of an employee and related issues." P.L. 1991, ch. 885 (effective
Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(7)) (emphasis
added). As originally enacted, the IME statute then provided that "[t]he commissioner may select an independent medical examiner." ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39,
§ 92-B(3) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). The new statute lacks this provision.
The implication is that an IME will participate in every dispute. Even if this is not
the case, one party may always impose an IME on the other, thereby raising due
process issues.
22. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REV.
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The deference accorded the IME's findings makes the process unusual as well. Essentially, all evidence of the employee's medical
condition must be gathered by the IME.2 3 She therefore shoulders

responsibility for collecting and analyzing a potentially daunting
quantity of data. From the information gathered, the 1ME submits a
written report to the hearing officer and both parties, providing a
description of her findings and the basis for them.2 ' If additional

information is submitted to the IME after the report has been filed,
but before the hearing, the IME must file a supplemental report
only if the data affects her decision.25
Despite the statute's attempt to depict them as evidence, the
IME's findings are essentially binding. Once the report is fied, the
parties can challenge only the IME's interpretation of the evidence.
In fact, the statute's instructions to the Board sound like a "clear
error" standard, used by appellate courts reviewing findings of
fact.26 Once the hearing officer adopts them in her decision, the

IME's fact-findings
sail through the system, enjoying almost unchal2 7
lengeable status.

The system places the IME in an ambiguous role. Initially, she
functions as an investigator for the Board, ferreting out important
information on the government's behalf. She then transforms into a
breed of high-powered, expert witness, who interprets a large body
of information for the Board, subject to little or no direct challenge.
Finally, her role shifts to resemble the fact-finder, as her decision is
for all practical purposes binding. At all three stages, the IME's chameleon nature raises constitutional issues.
The opportunity to confront and rebut adverse evidence underpins our legal system. Nevertheless, a full-blown trial cannot be held
in every setting. The fundamental question is whether the 1MM sysSTAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(7)).

23.

"The parties shall submit any medical records or other pertinent information

to the independent medical examiner. In addition to the review of records and information submitted by the parties, the independent medical examiner may examine the
employee as often as the examiner determines necessary. . . ." P.L. 1991, ch. 885, §
A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(4)).
24. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. Rav.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(5)).
25. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Ma Ray.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(6)).
26. Cf. Lowe v. C.N. Brown Co., 448 A.2d 1358, 1362 (Me. 1982) (factual findings
of Workers' Compensation Commission reviewed only to determine whether the record contained competent evidence to support them).
27. The new workers' compensation statute bars review of a hearing officer's findings of fact. P.L. 1991, ch. 885 § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Ma.
Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 320) (appeal to full Board); P.L. 1991, ch. 885 § A-8 (Act
effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 320) (appeal
to Law Court). Both sections provide that "there may be no appeal upon findings of
fact."
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tem allows each party a meaningful opportunity to be heard.2 8 Perhaps in recognition of the potential for constitutional attack, the

Legislature left room for the Board to flesh out the statute by directing it to adopt the rules necessary to implement the IME system. 29 Indeed, the rule-making provision of the former statute allowed the Medical Coordinator to draft regulations which, in fact,
cured some of the significant defects in the state."
III.

THE BROAD OUTLINE OF DUE PROCESS

The constitutional guarantee of due process prior to loss of liberty
or property 3 is not immutable, but is "flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands."3 Due
process may therefore boil down to the court's view of what is fair.""
28.
29.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (Act effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A § 312(4)).
30. Chapter 10 of the Rules of the Office of the Medical Coordinator was effective
August 1, 1992 and was drafted by the Medical Coordinator pursuant to the original
IME provisions of the statute. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 92-B(4) (West Supp.
1991-1992). The new statute directs the Board to adopt the rules necessary to implement the IME system. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(1)). This Comment will assume that the
Board's regulations under the new statute will be substantially similar to the Medical
Coordinator's.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.. . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."); MAINE CONST. art. I § 6-A
("No person may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law
."). The Law Court has consistently interpreted the Maine and federal due process standards as providing equivalent levels of protection. See Fichter v. Board of
Envtl. Protection, 604 A.2d 433, 436-38 (Me. 1992); Penobscot Area Housing Dev.
Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 24 n.9 (1981) (citing a line of cases back to
1939). The Law Court, however, as a matter of policy looks first to the Maine Constitution. See Glen S. Goodnough, The Primacy Method of State ConstitutionalDccisionmaking: Interpreting the Maine Constitution, 38 ME.L. REv.491 (1986). Goodnough points to a number of cases where the Law Court in fact "interpreted the
Maine Constitution to provide greater protection to individual rights than mandated
by the United States Constitution." Id. at 494-95. In light of the nebulous standards
applied by courts nationwide when confronted by procedural due process issues, at.
tempting to distinguish a Maine standard from a federal standard seems fruitless.
Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 with Secure Env'ts, Inc. v. Nor.
ridgewock, 544 A.2d 319 (Me. 1988).
The potentially interesting aspect of the distinction would arise if the losing party
wishes to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. If the Law Court held that the
IME system offended the Maine Constitution, then the state court might effectively
insulate its decision from Supreme Court review. See Goodnough, supra note 31, at
510-18. It is well settled that a state has the authority to interpret its constitution as
providing more extensive protection of individual rights than the Federal Constitu.
tion does. Id. at 492 n.3.
32. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334 (citing Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972)).
33. See, e.g., Secure Env'ts, Inc. v. Norridgewock, 544 A.2d at 324-25 ("[D]ue pro-
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Depending on the context, courts have interpreted due process to
require that parties have several rights. Professor John Wigmore
suggests due process includes the right: (1) to an impartial decision
maker; (2) to submit evidence; (3) to be informed of the evidence;
(4) to question and challenge adverse evidence; (5) to have third
party assistance in gathering, presenting, and evaluating evidence;
and (6) to have a reasoned explanation of the evidence by the decision maker.3 " Arthur Larson, a recognized authority on workers'
compensation law, provides a roughly parallel list in his discussion
of "Rules based on fair play and privilege." 35 Larson suggests that
the fundamental elements of fair play are "the right of cross-examination, rules against ex parte statements, necessity of having all evidence on the record, and restrictions on determinations made by independent investigation conducted by the tribunal."30
When deciding how extensive the procedural protections need to
be in a given situation, courts have frequently used the three-part37
analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."
Unfortunately, this often repeated formula provides little help for
determining the validity of a statute or procedure prior to a court's
decision. As Wigmore pointed out, "there is a great deal of looseness
in the joints of procedural due process."3 '9 Despite this disclaimer,
cess is not a static concept; rather, its requirements vary to assure the basic fairness
of each particular action according to its circumstances." (quoting In re Jo-Nell C.,

493 A.2d 1053, 1055 (Me. 1985))).
34. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE
lers rev. ed. 1983).
35. 3 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF
Supp. 1990).

ON EVIDENCE

§

7.1, at 499.507 (Peter Til-

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §

79.83 (1989 &

36. Id.
37. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. For Maine cases applying the Mathews
framework, see Hale v. Pettit, 438 A.2d 226 (Me. 1981) and Fichter v. Board of EnvtL
Protection, 604 A.2d 433 (Me. 1992).
38. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254,
263-71 (1970)).
39. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 7.1 at 495. As Wigmore noted:
[T]he law of procedural due process remains in flux and... an inordinate
amount of value should not be paid to precedent. (Only a prophet can
safely predict the future shape of the law of procedural due process and the
specific meanings that will be attributed to the rights listed above ....
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the case law does provide some guidance. Reviewing decisions from
similar situations will identify the aspects of the IME system that
are subject to attack.
IV.

LIBERTY OR PROPERTY

Due process requires that either a liberty or property interest be
at stake.40 While liberty interests are usually easily identified, property interests are harder to determine." In the United States, for
example, the government provides its citizens with a number of benefits. The courts have recognized such "statutory entitlements" as a
form of property, where the statute creates a right rather than a
privilege. 2 In the past, programs analogous to workers' compensation have been deemed to create statutory property.
The Supreme Court recognized welfare benefits as property in
Goldberg v. Kelly 43 and social security as property in Mathews v.

Eldridge.44 In both cases, the government did not attempt to argue
that the government-supplied benefits were not property interests.
Nevertheless, the Court addressed the issue in both cases. As the
Court said in Goldberg, "[s]ociety today is built around entitlement
....
Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow
from the government .

.

. Such sources of security . . . are no

longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are
essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity."4
Workers' compensation deserves the same status. All fifty states
have enacted workers' compensation laws based on the idea that
"industrial employers should assume costs of occupational disabilities without regard to any fault involved."' 46 In virtually every state,
workers' compensation coverage for employees is compulsory.47 The
[I]t is not always easy to determine whether the rights listed will apply at

all.)
Id. at 508.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333.
41. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332-33; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.

at 262. Compare Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504
F.2d 483, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1974) (the right to a particular rent in low income housing
is a property right) with Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1247 (1st Cir. 1970) (not a
property right).

42. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332-33 (social security benefits);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262 (welfare benefits). For a complete discussion, see
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
43. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262.
44. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332.
45. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255
(1965)).
46.

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1991 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS

vii (1991).
47. Id. at 6-8 (Texas does not require insurance for private employers or for coun-
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necessity of workers' compensation law for our industrial economy
to function should ensure that courts will view it as a property

interest.48
V. How MUCH PROCESS Is DuE?
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
40

to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'

,

If a property interest is threatened, due process will require at bare
minimum that the parties receive notice of jeopardy and an opportunity to be heard.50 This seemingly clear formula, however, creates
at least two obvious questions: What constitutes an opportunity to
be heard? What procedural safeguards will make the opportunity

meaningful?
Administrative hearings have been a hotbed of due process litigation in the past. In no other setting is the power of the legislature
more unclear or the necessity of procedural protection more debatable. Two landmark United States Supreme Court Cases, Goldberg v.
Kelly 5' and Mathews v. Eldridge52 illustrate the spectrum of
possibilities.
Goldberg v. Kelly marks the outer limits of procedural protections
required by the Supreme Court in an administrative setting.5 The
Court held that prior to termination of welfare benefits, the recipient was entitled to a full hearing, including oral presentation of evidence and cross-examination." In addition, the Court required that
an impartial decision-maker decide the case based solely on the "legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing" and that he state the
"reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied
on." 55 In essence, Goldberg imposed all of Wigmore's potential protections on an administrative hearing. In doing so, the Court emphasized the magnitude of the welfare recipient's interest. "Against the
justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the individties, municipalities or other political subdivisions. It does cover state employees. New
Jersey does not require coverage for private employees, but does require it for public
employees.).

48. See, e.g., Paco v. American Leather Mfg. Co., 516 A.2d 623, 625 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1986). Cf. Gauthier v. Penobscot Chem. Fiber Co. (Gauthier's Case),
120 Me. 73, 76, 113 A. 28, 31 (1921) ("Upon the happening of an industrial accident

the right to receive compensation becomes vested, and the obligation to pay it
fixed."). In Maine, due process has even been imposed on the state's procedures to
suspend a driver's license. Giberson v. Quinn, 445 A.2d 1007 (Me. 1982).
49. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
50. 1 WIGMORE,supra note 34 at 499.

51.
52.
53.
54.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
1 WIGMORE, supra note 34, at 476 n.3.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 270-71.

55.

Id. at 271.
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ual's overpowering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance. ' 56 The extent of procedural due process7
should be directly proportional to the weight of the party's need.1
Considering that the primary issue in Goldberg was the timing of
the hearing, the holding becomes even more powerful. The procedure challenged in Goldberg provided for a full hearing after the
termination of the welfare benefits; the Court held that this was inadequate protection, and that the recipient's opportunity to be
heard must come prior to termination.5 8 Since Maine's workers'
compensation law provides for one fact-finding opportunity, the argument for Goldberg's extensive protections is even more
compelling.
The Goldberg Court also lambasted the practice of conducting paper hearings to reach so important a decision.
The city's procedures presently do not permit recipients to appear personally with or without counsel before the official who finally determines continued eligibility. Thus a recipient is not permitted to present evidence to that official orally, or to confront or
cross-examine adverse witnesses. These omissions are fatal to the
constitutional adequacy of the procedures. 9
The Court reasoned that the process must be tailored to the capacities of the parties involved, and noted that without counsel most
welfare recipients would be unable to adequately defend themselves
adequately in writing.60 Most important, the Court held that a paper
hearing did not allow the fact-finder to analyze credibility and
veracity.61
In a startling about-face, the Supreme Court came to the opposite
conclusion six years later in Mathews v. Eldridge, demonstrating
just how unpredictable "due process" can be. The issue in Mathews
was whether the same sort of full-blown evidentiary hearing required by Goldberg prior to termination of welfare benefits was also
required before cutting off social security payments.6 2 Cruelly misled
by the seemingly clear holding in Goldberg, the fourth district affirmed the district court's holding that a hearing was necessary.03
Creating the now well-known three-step analysis, 6' the Supreme
Court reversed.
56. Id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
57. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
58. Id. at 270-71.
59. Id. at 268.
60. Id. at 268-69.
61. Id. at 269.
62. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323.
63. See Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973); Eldridge v.
Weinberger, 493 F.2d. 1230 (4th Cir. 1974).
64. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. See supra text accompanying note 38
quoting Mathews test.
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With respect to the first factor of the three-step analysis, the
Court emphasized the "degree of potential deprivation," and arrived
at the puzzling conclusion that social security benefits are not as
vital to the recipient as welfare benefits." Despite recognizing the
"torpidity of this administrative review process" and the "typically
modest resources of the family unit of the physically disabled
worker," the Court viewed the social security recipient's potential
hardship as less than that of the welfare recipient.0 8 Teetering on
the verge of a non-sequitur, the Court announced that "[e]ligibility
for disability benefits... is not based upon financial need."0 7
Applying the second factor, the Court analyzed the "fairness and
reliability of existing pretermination procedures, and the probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards."0' 8 Following more
readily discernible logic, the Court pointed out that "medical assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition . . . is a more
sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement."69' Relying on Richardson v. Perales,"0 the Court distinguished Goldberg, emphasizing that credibility and veracity are not nearly as questionable in the medical
context. 1
The Court also found adequate safeguards against mistake. Typically, physicians buttress their reports with such evidence as Xrays
or lab tests. 2 Prior to termination of benefits, the social security
recipient had notice of and access to the evidence submitted, and an
opportunity to submit written rebuttal. Because this opportunity included a detailed questionnaire, the prospect of a recipient being
unable to express her position adequately was diminished.7 3 At the
bottom line lurked the questionable idea that medical assessments
7
are more objective than judgments of issues like financial need. '
Using the third factor, the Court examined the administrative
65. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340-43.
66. Id. at 342.
67. Id. at 340. Concededly, strict logic is on the Court's side; the benefits at issue
are based on disability. However, the percentage of our work force able to support
itself for any length of time without income is well known to be small, as the Court
admits. Id. at 342. In fact, the Court's statement discounts the facts before it. "Indeed, in the present case, it is indicated that because disability benefits were terminated there was foreclosure upon the Eldridge home and the family's furniture was
repossessed, forcing Eldridge, his wife, and their children to sleep in one bed." Id. at
350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Marshall, J., concurring in the dissent).
68. Id. at 343.
69. Id.
70. 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (See Part V.B., notes 116-24 and accompanying text for
discussion of Richardson).
71. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-44.
72. Id. at 345.
73. Id. at 345-46.
74. See Part V.B., note 119.
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burden of further safeguards and the public interest. "At some point
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by
the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.

' 75

This

proposition seems hard to refute. In the Court's view, the procedures satisfied the essence of due process in that
both parties had a
"meaningful opportunity to present their case."176
Comparing Mathews with Goldberg demonstrates the unpredictability of due process analysis. The conclusion that social security
benefits are less vital to the recipient than welfare benefits rings
hollow, as does the Court's absurd rationale that social security is
based on disability rather than financial need. Surely, social security
embodies a recognition that disability creates need. Rather than
representing a closely-reasoned decision, based on a fine distinction
from Goldberg, Mathews arguably demonstrates a growing awareness of administrative burdens. In essence, the Court held that the
procedures were "fair enough" in light of the potential costs.
Unfortunately, this means that Goldberg, and Mathews provide
no clear answer for the constitutionality of the IME system. The
program appears more analogous to Mathews since, technically,
workers' compensation benefits are not based on financial need and
the IME issues are medical. On the other hand, the decisions are not
merely preliminary, subject to an eventual full-blown evidentiary
hearing. Unlike the social security procedure in Mathews, the Maine
workers' compensation system allows for only one hearing.
Thinking strictly in terms of the Mathews three-stage analysis
leads to a view of an administrative system as a seamless whole. If
the procedure, viewed in its entirety, seems essentially fair to both
parties, then it stands. Our Constitution, however, creates different
issues at different phases in the process.
Because of the IME's unique role in Maine's workers' compensation program, the IME system raises constitutional issues at each
stage of the dispute resolution mechanism. Although the underlying
policy concern is always that each party have a "meaningful opportunity to be heard," the specific constitutional safeguards available
vary as parties pass through each stage of the process. As her role
shifts from investigator to expert witness to fact-finder, the IME
will face challenges to the constitutionality of her existence which
will mirror those changes. While she functions as an investigator,
due process demands fairness to both parties as the IME gathers the
evidence. During her witness phase, due process may require that
the parties have an opportunity to cross-examine her. Finally, once
the IME assumes the role of fact-finder, due process protects the
75.
76.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 349.
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record for meaningful appellate review.
A.

Investigator

In her initial incarnation, the IME functions as an administrative
investigator, gathering information to aid the decision-making process. At this stage in the proceeding, the focus is on the evidence.
Therefore, the IME system should incorporate at least three of Wigmore's evidentiary protections during this phase: the right to submit
evidence, the right to be informed of evidence, and the right to chal77
lenge adverse evidence.
At this stage, no problem arises with regard to the right to submit

evidence. Each side has the right to submit evidence to the IME for
consideration. 1 An IME's decision, however, effectively relies on in-

formation gathered without opportunity for rebuttal. 70 The parties
may submit evidence to her and she may examine the employee personally. No provision is made, however, to notify the parties of the
other side's adverse evidence until after the damage has been
done-when she files her report.80 As noted earlier, once the report
is adopted by the hearing officer, it is virtually unassailable. 1
Admittedly, the statute provides that both the parties and the
hearing officer receive the report.8 2 Although the time allotted prior
to the hearing for the parties to review the report is left undefined,
the statute does presume that the parties receive the report three
days after mailing.83 Evidence in response to the report can come
only from the employee's doctor, submitted at least fourteen days
prior to the hearing.'
77. 1 WIGMORa, supra note 34, § 7.1, at 502-505.
78. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at NL.Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(4)). Neither the Maine Rules of Evidence nor the Federal
Rules apply to an administrative proceeding. ME. R. Evw. 1101(a); FED. R. Evi.
1101(a). Neither may the parties look to the Administrative Procedure Act, M. REv
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 8001-11008 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991-1992), for guidance. If the
Legislature's intent was to create a separate procedure, then the act is inapplicable.
Hale v. Pettit, 438 A.2d 226, 231 (Me. 1981). By its own terms, the Administrative
Procedure Act does not apply to Workers' Compensation Commission proceedings.
MF. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9051 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991-1992). The power of the
Legislature to vary the admissibility and weight of evidence within constitutional
bounds is well settled. See, e.g., Ziehm v. Ziehm, 433 A-2d 725, 727 (Me. 1981) (citing
Mansfield v. Gushee, 114 A. 296, 298 (1921)).
79. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Mi.& REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(4)).
80. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at M. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(5)).
81. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
82. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Mn. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit 39-A, § 312(5)).
83. Id.
84. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(6)).
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These provisions do not even resemble an opportunity to meet
and rebut the evidence. Satisfying the requirement that the parties
be allowed to submit evidence is a bare constitutional minimum. 85
The parties do not receive notice of the adverse evidence until it is
too late.
The statute's requirement that all evidence be filtered through the
IME creates this shortcoming. Because the hearing officer is allowed
to consider only evidence presented to the IME, the lone opportunity to rebut adverse evidence arises during the window between the
IME's report and the hearing. During that time, if the IME can be
persuaded to change her mind, a supplemental report might be generated." The statute, however, allows only evidence from the "treating health care provider."8
Taken literally, this provision allows no opportunity to rebut at
all. 88 If the procedure outlined by the statute is followed, neither
party will be aware of the evidence submitted by the other, except
when it is revealed in the IME's report. Any chance to rebut the
other side's evidence is rendered meaningless, because the IME will
entertain only subsequent evidence from the treating health care
provider. This provision should particularly upset employers and insurers, since a doctor will be more likely to sympathize with her patient than with a faceless employer or insurer.8 9
Essentially, the question is whether an opportunity to be heard
can be meaningful when the parties cannot meet adverse evidence
head on. The process provides each side with a chance to tell its
version of the story, but an opportunity to refute the other's "facts"
is one of the linchpins of due process. While administrative due process is an elastic concept, being informed of adverse evidence after a
final decision is reached stretches it past the breaking point.
The system creates a primarily paper hearing. First, only the employee presents evidence to the IME in person-during her physical
85. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 7.1, at 502-504 n.62.
86. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(6)).
87. Id.
88. A rule of thumb for statutory interpretation is to begin with the "plain language of the statute." United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
"The plain meaning should be conclusive, except in 'rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'" Id. (citation omitted). In light of the Legislature's intention to
curtail the dispute resolution process, there is no reason to discount the statute's
plain language. Therefore, the Legislature intended that no evidence be submitted to
the IME by the parties to rebut any of the conclusions in her report.
89. Common sense would dictate that doctors, as a group, must possess a higher
level of compassion than the rest of us. Their estimation of an employee's disability
may be unconsciously prejudiced by their natural impulses to relieve suffering. See
Letter from Michael W. Mainen, M.D., to Senator Donald E. Esty, Jr., (May 24,
1991) reprinted in MEMORANDUM, supra note 8.
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examination. Communication between the employer and the IME
must be in writing." Second, the IME submits her findings to the
hearing officer as a written report.9 1 Although this form of hearing is
not necessarily unconstitutional, courts do tend to insist that the
parties be given an effective opportunity to rebut adverse evidence.02
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has
addressed similar situations in the past. Gauthier'sCase 3 a vintage
Maine workers' compensation decision, offers some guidance. Mathias Gauthier broke his leg in an accident while employed by the
Penobscot Chemical Fibre Company. Unfortunately, the leg never
healed properly and within two years it had to be amputated.0 ' Penobscot disputed the conclusion that the accident necessarily led to
the amputation.9 5 The Law Court overturned the original decree
awarding compensation because it was based on facts "recited in the
commission's findings, which [did] not appear in evidence.""0 Although the Industrial Accident Commission (now the Workers'
Compensation Board) was an administrative body, the court noted
its exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Then, as today, the commission's findings of fact were all but unappealable.9
Due to their finality, the findings could not stand, since the parties had not had an appropriate opportunity to meet all adverse evidence. "It should go without saying that such final findings must be
grounded upon evidence presented under such circumstances as to
afford full opportunity for comment, explanation and refutation." '
As today, the statute at the time allowed "certain medical testimony
to be taken ex parte."99 The court in Gauthier, however, refused to
let such testimony serve as the foundation of a decree, unless each
party was provided the opportunity to rebut it.1"'
90. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Mh. Ray.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(4)); Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.16 ("All... communication be-

tween the examiner and the parties [except between the IME and the employee or
previous health care providers] must be in writing .... ").
91. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Ma REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(5)).
92. See Part V.B., notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
93. Gauthier v. Penobscot Chem. Fiber Co. (Gauthier's Case), 120 Me. 73, 113 A.
28 (1921).
94. Id. at 74-75, 113 A. at 29.
95. Id. at 77, 113 A. at 30.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 78, 113 A. at 31 ("From the commission's findings of fact there is in the
absence of fraud, no appeal."). Today, findings of fact appear entirely unappealable.
P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Ma Rav. ST^T. ANN.
tit. 39-A, §§ 320 (no appeal to Board); § 322 (no appeal to Law Court)).
98. Gauthier v. Penobscot Chem. Fiber Co. (Gauthier's Case), 120 Me. at 78, 113
A. at 31.
99.

Id.

100. Id.
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Hutchinson's Case,10 1 another seasoned Maine workers' compensation decision, also emphasizes the importance of a meaningful opportunity to confront adverse evidence. Lucy A. Hutchinson's husband died in an accident, while he was employed by the Bangor
Railway & Electric Company. The Commissioner based his decision,
in part, on "'information gained from personal observation on two
visits to the power plant.' "1102 Citing Gauthier, the Law Court sustained the appeal because the Commissioner relied on evidence that
he gathered
in a manner that precluded the parties from refuting
it.lo 3 Had the parties been present during the visit, or at least
waived that right, the Commissioner might have viewed the plant to
better understand the evidence submitted. Even then, however, the
observations made at the plant could not form the basis for a
decision. 10 '
In a similar situation, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
reached the same conclusion. In Meunier's Case, 0 5 an insurer challenged a Massachusetts workers' compensation statute, which provided for a board of three impartial medical referees who would investigate claims and make a report to the department. This report
included "'the results of their study, together with their diagnosis
and their opinion as to the extent and cause of disability,'" and was
binding on the parties. 0 6 The court acknowledged the power of the
Legislature to "prescribe the rules of evidence"
and "the weight that
07
must be accorded to certain evidence."1

Nonetheless, the court struck down the statute because it did not
provide for a complete transcript of the investigations underlying
the decision. This statute denied the adversely affected party both
the opportunity to explain or refute the report, and the opportunity
to introduce "all available material evidence in support of or defence
against the claimant to have it considered and weighed by the trier
of fact." 08
These cases suggest that the IME system suffers from at least two
problems. First, even if all the evidence relied on appears in the record, 09 it does not come to the attention of the parties in time for
rebuttal. Second, the statute does not require that the IME notify
the employer prior to an examination of the employee. 1" 0 Without
101.
A. 626
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Hutchinson v. Bangor Ry. & Elec. Co. (Hutchinson's Case), 123 Me. 250, 122
(1923).
Id. at 254, 122 A. at 628.
Id. at 255, 122 A. at 628-29.
Id.
66 N.E.2d 198 (Mass. 1946).
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
See Part V.C., notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REv.

1993]

DUE PROCESS AND THE IME SYSTEM

notice, the employer cannot attend the physical examination. The
IME therefore gathers the most significant evidence in the case
without the employer having an opportunity to be present.
The regulations drafted by the Medical Coordinator nearly provide the necessary knowledge of the other side's evidence. "All...
communication between the examiner and the parties [other than
between the IME and the employee] must be in writing and copied
to all opposing parties no later than seven days prior to the scheduled examination."'1 1 Obviously, if the parties are required to send
copies of everything to their opponents, then adverse evidence
would come to light. Again, however, the timing is unsatisfactory.
By simply waiting for the deadline before submitting one's evidence,
a party may avoid affording its opponent a meaningful opportunity
to rebut that evidence. This is a significant loophole which must be
closed in order to satisfy due process. Similarly, the regulation setting forth notice requirements prior to an independent medical examination appears to omit the employer, unless it requested the examination.""' Logically, the employer would have greater need of
notice when it did not request the examination. A simple rewording
to clarify the regulation, however, would easily cure this minor
defect.
B. Expert Witness
Once the IMB submits her report, her status shifts to something
closer to an expert witness. A physician's testimony, either oral or
by written report, is familiar fodder for judicial or administrative
decisions. 13 Workers' compensation hearing officers have undoubtedly listened to more than their share of medical testimony. If we
characterize the HME as a form of expert witness, however, the parties will certainly expect to cross-examine her. No other procedural
due process right is so frequently invoked.11 4 Court responses to deANN.tit. 39-A, § 312(4)). See also Camizzi v. E.T. Fraim Lock Co., 29 A.2d 425,
427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) ("It was proper for the board to view appellee's hand but it
should not have been done in the absence of counsel for appellants, or at least until
after notice had been given them of the intention of the board and an opportunity
STAT.

afforded them to be present.").
111. Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.16(A) (effective Aug. 1, 1992).
112. Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.15(F)(1) (effective Aug. 1, 1992) provides: "If the commissioner selects an independent medical examiner, the commissioner shall issue a
notification of the examiner's name, date, time, and location of the independent medical exam, by regular mail to the examiner, employee, requester, counsel, and the

Office of Medical Coordination" (emphasis added). Arguably, "counsel" encompasses
both parties, which would solve the problem.
113. See, e.g., Taylor's Case, 127 Me. 207, 210-11, 142 A. 730 (1928) (doctor's tes-

timony in workers' compensation case); Weis Markets, Inc. v. W.C.A.B., 572 A.2d
1295, 1297 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (unsworn certificate from physician admissible in

workers' compensation claim for fewer than twenty-five weeks disability).
114. 3 LARSON, supra note 35, § 79.83(b).
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mands for cross-examination, however, are erratic. Particular confusion has arisen over the rules of evidence in the administrative setting in tandem with the right to cross-examine and challenge
evidence.' 15
Richardson v. Perales,"2

another landmark United States Su-

preme Court decision, addressed a similar situation. The issue was
"whether physicians' written reports of medical examinations they
have made of a disability claimant may constitute 'substantial evidence' supportive of a finding of nondisability." I 7 The Court held
that they could, noting that the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare had statutory power to establish procedures." 5 Although
the Court seemed to approve in general the use of written medical
reports in administrative hearings, the holding was specifically limited. The discussion of medical reports acknowledged that they may
be admitted in formal trials as a hearsay exception, and asserted
that the circuit courts of appeal have "uniformly recognized reliability and probative value in such reports." 1 9 In addition, the Court
recognized that "'the sheer magnitude of that administrative burden'" made the reports necessary."'
The Court's rationale, however, relied on a procedural point. The
Social Security statute provided that the claimant had the right to
subpoena the physician for oral examination.' 21 Since the claimant
failed to exercise this option, he was "precluded from now complaining that he was denied the rights of confrontation and crossexamination. 1"

2

Despite the Court's impressive dicta approving

written medical reports, the holding depended on the failure of the
claimant to exercise his procedural rights.
A vigorous dissent condemned the decision of the majority. In the
dissent's view, even if such hearsay evidence is admissible, it cannot
constitute substantial evidence to support the findings of the Secre115.

116.
117.
118.
119.

1 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 4; 3 LARSON, supra note 35, § 79.83(b).
402 U.S. 389 (1971).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 405. From a policy perspective, the idea that medical reports are inher-

ently reliable crumbles in the workers' compensation context. At least when medical
reports are excepted from the hearsay rule, the perceived reliability stems from the
patient's self-interest in obtaining appropriate treatment. See FED. R. EvID. 803(4)
(Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules). In the workers' compensation

examination context, this motive disappears; the worker's motive is at least influenced by his desire/need for compensation. Anyone who has ever been to a doctor

knows how heavily the doctor must rely on the patient's own description of his malady. Without the usual motive for the patient's truthfulness, the doctor's report may
be rendered wholly unreliable.
120. Richardson v. Peraes, 402 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 404, applying the 1970 version of 20 C.F.R. § 404.926.

122. Id. at 405.
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tary, unless corroborated and tested by cross-examination.'"
"[H]earsay evidence in the nature of ex parte statements of doctors
on the critical issue of a man's present physical condition is just a
violation of the concept with which I am familiar and 2which bears
upon the issue of fundamental fair play in a hearing."' '
Because the holding was so limited, the Perales decision has not
resolved the fundamental tension between the need for administrative efficiency and the right to confront adverse witnesses. Numerous lower court decisions have wrestled with this problem, without
creating a distinguishable trend of opinion. 12 5 Although the right of
cross-examination is the most frequently invoked element
of due
1 20
process, the decisions have not achieved uniformity.
Whether Goldberg, Perales, and their progeny require cross-examination of the IME will probably be the most unpredictable issue
the system generates. As drafted, the IME procedure will be almost
entirely a paper hearing loaded with the ex parte findings of examining physicians.127 While Goldberg disapproved of such a process,
the aggressive dicta in Perales points toward a more forgiving
standard.
The Medical Coordinator's regulation which allows either party to
depose the IME prior to the formal hearing, however, may resolve
any constitutional deficiency of this process. 28 Even a Goldberg approach might be satisfied by this regulation. Although providing for
depositions re-injects lawyers into the system and undermines to
123. Id. at 413 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 414 (citing Judge Spears, who issued the district court opinion that
overturned the judgment against the claimant, sub nom., Perales v. Secretary of

Health, Educ. and Welfare, 288 F. Supp. 313, 314 (W.D. Tex. 1968)).
125. See, e.g., North Am. Coal Co. v. Miller, 870 F.2d. 948 (3rd Cir. 1989) (due

process right to cross-examine physician); Republic Steel Corp. v. Leonard,
206 (3rd Cir. 1980) (award of benefits based on ex parte medical reports
tional); U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Webb, 595 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1979)
reports sufficiently trustworthy to constitute substantial evidence without

635 F.2d
constitu.
(medical
cros.-ex-

amination); Jackson v. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo.
1990) (summary adjudication without opportunity to cross-examine physician denies
due process); Froysland v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 432 N.W.2d

883 (N.D. 1988) (no state obligation to bear cost of cross-examination of physician);
Jones v. Jesse's Disposal Serv., 702 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1985) (reports received into evi-

dence not subject to cross-examination did not prejudice claimant when identical evidence properly admitted was sufficient to support decision); John J. Orr & Sons, Inc.
v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1984) (documentary hearing allowable at pretrial conference); Baker v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 399 S.E.2d 630 (Va. CL App. 1990) (no absolute right to cross); Paco v. American Leather Mfg. Co., 516 k2d 623 (N.J. Super. CL

App. Div. 1986) (fundamental due process right to cross-examination and presentation of oral evidence must be respected in workers' compensation hearing).
126. 3 LARSON, supra note 35, § 79.83(b).
127. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Ma Ray
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(4)-(7)).
128. Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.16(E) (effective Aug. 1, 1992).

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:123

some extent the purpose behind the IME system, that same provision may effectively foreclose the most forceful constitutional objection to the system.
Maine Decisions
Examination of the relevant Maine decisions yields the same conclusion. While authority exists to support administrative efficiency
over an absolute right to cross-examine as well as the opposite view,
the Medical Coordinator's regulations should satisfy the Law
Court's view of administrative due process. Although the private interests at issue have not been on par with workers' compensation
benefits, the cases betray a trend toward heightened sympathy for
the burdens of the administrative agency.
Ziehm v. Ziehm, 12 9 decided in 1981, supports the proposition that
parties to an administrative proceeding have a right to cross-examine witnesses. Ziehm was a child custody case. The mother, having lost custody of her two daughters to the father, challenged the
validity of a statute conferring evidentiary status on a custody report from the Department of Human Services (DHS). The court upheld the statute, reasoning that "[c]ounsel have access to the DHS
report at least three days before the hearing and are assured at the
hearing of a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the maker of
the report and
to rebut the conclusion and underlying facts stated in
30
the report."1

Similarly, in Public Utilities Commission v. Cole's Express' 81 the
Law Court held that parties must be provided an opportunity for
32
cross-examination and rebuttal in an administrative context.1
Cole's Express challenged a decision of the Public Utilities Commission that established uniform rates for common motor carriers. The
court struck down the decision, in part, because the Commission
based "its findings upon evidence or purported knowledge, which
[was] not made a part of the record.' 3 3 The Commission had based
its decision on a report of the New England Motor Rate Bureau,
reports filed by other motor carriers, tariff studies, and reports filed
by Cole's Express in other proceedings. Analyzing a variety of authorities, the court concluded that "evidence [must be] produced
under such circumstances as to give to both parties a full opportu129. 433 A.2d 725 (Me. 1981).
130. Id. at 729 (citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967) ("in making a factfinding in a criminal case, use of a psychiatric report that is
not disclosed to the parties nor subject to cross-examination and rebuttal violates due
process")).
131. 138 A.2d 466 (Me. 1958).
132. Id. at 470-71 (quoting Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 324 U.S.
548, 562 (1945)).
133. Public Util. Comm'n v. Cole's Express, 138 A.2d at 468.
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nity for explanation and refutation. '1 3' The court further asserted
that the opportunity must include cross-examination.1 35
On the other hand, burgeoning authority supports the view that
administrative proceedings do not require cross-examination to satisfy due process. As early as 1973, the Law Court began to erode
administrative due process, deciding In Re Maine Clean Fuels,
Inc.,'" which stands for the proposition that cross-examination need
not be oral.137 Maine's Site Location Law, as implemented by the
Chairman of the Environment Improvement Commission (EIC),
provided for questioning of witnesses through written submissions
to the Chair. Maine Clean Fuels challenged an adverse ruling, and
contended that "this procedure so restricted the right of cross-examination as to amount to a denial of administrative due process...
render[ing] it ineffective for purposes of discrediting adverse testimony."13 s The court disagreed.
In a comprehensive statement of administrative due process law,
the court observed that cross-examination "has not yet attained the
status of an absolute universally guaranteed requirement in administrative proceedings." 3 It emphasized the wisdom of the general
rule allowing administrative agencies to develop their own procedures in absence of legislative directive,1 4 0 and balanced the effectiveness of the procedure against the cost of its replacement with
unrestricted oral cross-examination."4 On balance, the court found
that written questioning provided adequate protection at a reasonable cost. 4'
In the end, however, the court refrained from finding a due process right to cross-examination: "We note that the appellant has
failed to point out, even arguendo, any specific instance where unrestricted oral cross-examination would have been more effective
than the procedure actually utilized. The prejudice claimed is theoretical only and, if none results in fact we conclude that no error
was committed."' " Maine Clean Fuels therefore yields only the un134. Id. at 473 (quoting Gauthier v. Penobscot Chem. Fiber Co. (Gauthier's Case),
120 Me. 73, 78, 113 A. 28, 31 (1921)).
135. Id. at 470-71.
136. 310 A.2d 736 (Me, 1973).
137. Id. at 747-48.
138. Id. at 745.
139. Id. at 746 (citing Origet v. Hedden, 155 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1894)).
140. Id. at 744.
141. Id. at 747-48.
142. Id. at 748.
143. Id. (emphasis in original). This could be important for a challenge to the
IME procedures. As of Jan. 28, 1992, the draft of proposed procedures prepared by
the Medical Coordinator, Sandra Hayes, included provision for examination of the

IME (but not the other physicians reporting to the IME) through a deposition which
would then be included in the record presented to the hearing officer. At least one

message from Maine Clean Fuels would be to include specific assertions of harm.
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satisfying holding that absent prejudice, the court will not require
cross-examination.
In Hale v. Petit,4" the court went a bit farther. When the DHS
denied an applicant a certificate of need for construction of a nursing home, granting it instead to a competing party, the applicant
challenged the procedure through which the decision was made.
Prior to reaching a decision, the DHS held a hearing where each
party could present its plan and criticize the other's. The proceeding, however, did not include the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The Law Court held that due process requirements vary with
the type of proceeding, and that the procedures used were
adequate. 145
Again, however, the court limited its holding. In recognition of the
Mathews framework, the court considered the potential value that
cross-examination would have offered as an additional safeguard.
"Moreover, we do not see what additional benefit the plaintiffs
would have gained from cross-examining witnesses . . .. [The
plaintiffs] have not demonstrated how they were prejudiced
9146

Basing a decision on the idea that the moving party has not
demonstrated prejudice yields a weak rationale. Since the court has
no way to really know whether cross-examination would have shed a
different light on the testimony, the bald conclusion that it would
have been unavailing is sheer speculation. The assertion rings particularly hollow in a United States courtroom, where our legal system so reveres cross-examination as a guarantee of credibility and
veracity. 147 Both Hale and Maine Clean Fuels provide a mere "no
prejudice" rationale, which mirror the Mathews framework, but
48
render only a pale reflection.
A more recent challenge to an administrative hearing based on inAlthough Maine Clean Fuels pre-dated Mathews by three years, its consideration of
the potential benefits of cross-examination sounds very much like the second prong of
the Mathews analysis. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the
"no prejudice" rationale creates meager precedent.
144. 438 A.2d 226 (Me. 1981).
145. Id. at 231-32. The hearing in Hale was apparently conducted more like a
town meeting than a trial. Also, the interest involved is not on par with workers'
compensation benefits, if one applies the Mathews analysis. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
146. Id. at 232 (citing In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d at 748).
147. See, e.g., Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 435 (1836) (hearsay rule
based partly on lack of opportunity for cross-examination).
148. In the IME context, a "no prejudice" decision would be wholly unsatisfactory. Arguably, the process followed by the commission in years past, where both
parties presented expert, medical witnesses, demonstrates that a medical expert's

opinion does not establish any objective truth. If cross-examination has been a system component for decades, surely its benefits may be demonstrated, The Law Court
will have to provide a better answer.
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adequate opportunity for cross-examination was also rejected. Secure Environments, Inc. v. Norridgewck149 came before the Law
Court when the town's board of selectmen denied an application to
construct and operate a landfill. Secure Environments attacked the
decision-making process, arguing that the town offended due process
when it hired expert witnesses but did not disclose their identities
until the day of the hearing. As a result, Secure Environments
claimed, its opportunity to cross-examine was inadequate. Examining the transcript of the hearing, the Law Court found that Secure
Environments did not object to the conditions at the hearing, and
had in fact conducted a rigorous cross-examination. ' The requirement of "basic fairness" was therefore satisfied. If Secure Environments yields any guidance, it is that cross-examination need not be
conducted with trial precision.
Finally, in its most recent administrative due process decision, the
Law Court again denied the due process challenge. In Fichter v.
Board of Environmental Protection," ' the court applied the threestep Mathews analysis and held that the Board of Environmental
Protection did not need to afford parties the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses in a hearing over an application for a permit to
build on an oceanfront lot. The way the court framed the issue may
have sounded the death-knell for due process in the administrative
setting.
An administrative agency often acts in a quasi-legislative role. The
BEP acts in just such a capacity when it determines whether the
Department has appropriately applied legislative guidelines in
granting or denying applications for sand dune permits. The narrow question before us, which we answer in the negative, is whether
it is necessary to import into that quasi-legislative process all those
safeguards of a court proceeding in order to meet the requirements
of due process. 152
When the question is whether a "quasi-legislative" process requires
cross-examination, the answer flows easily.'15 The characterization,
149. 544 A.2d 319 (Me. 1988).
150. Id. at 325.
151. 604 A-2d 433 (Me. 1992).
152. Id. at 437.
153. "Where the administrative process could be characterized as quasi-legislative, or investigative, due process has been found not to require cross-examination."
In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d at 747 (footnotes omitted). See Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 303-308 (1933); Rivera v. Division
of Indus. Welfare, 71 CaL Rptr. 739, 750-51 (Cal. CL App. 1968) (cases cited in In re
Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d at 747, n.9, as holding that cross-examination is not
necessary in a quasi-legislative setting).
Hopefully, this does not mean that the Law Court can/will dispose of the IME
question by labelling it "investigative." Labels make poor rationales. See also
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,442 (1960) (cited in In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc. for
proposition that investigative functions do not require cross-examination).
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however, is unpersuasive.
Even the court's own description of the process it calls quasi-legislative sounds more quasi-judicial. Reviewing an agency's application
of legislative guidelines does not resemble law-making. Courts, however, perform that sort of function constantly. Simply calling a process "quasi-legislative" does not make it so.'"
If that is true, then the court's rationale must lie elsewhere. The
remainder of the opinion proceeds to apply the Mathews analysis,
weighing the private interest against the state's. First, the court
found that the Fichters' "interest in the full economic value of their
land. . . [was] offset by the third [Mathews] factor, the administrative burden to the BEP of providing cross-examination and rebuttal
rights to permit applicants." 55 Second, the court determined that
the "Fichters had ample opportunity to, present evidence both in
support of their application for a sand dune permit and in rebuttal
to any contrary evidence. The additional tools of cross-examination,
and of immediate rebuttal at the first meeting, would have provided
• . . little if any help."' 56
Fichter's"no help" rationale stands for more than the watery "no
prejudice" statements from Hale and Maine Clean Fuels. There is a
difference between the court announcing that the moving party has
failed in its burden to persuade the court of prejudice, and stating
flatly that cross-examination would not have helped. Fichteroffers a
stronger holding, using the Mathews "value of additional safeguards" test to bolster its decision. Unlike Hale and Maine Clean
Fuels, where the court essentially said the moving party did not
meet its burden, Fichter simply says that the burden cannot be met.
Nevertheless, the "little or no value of additional safeguards" rationale should not apply to the IME system. First, the previous system employed cross-examination in its hearings for decades, which
implies wide recognition of its value. Second, because the IME faces
issues that cannot be entirely bifurcated from their non-medical
component,157 cross-examination might be the only effective method
to elicit the flaws in her decision.
Reviewing the foregoing cases, a trend emerges. The Mathews
test, which balances the private interest and the administrative burden, runs through all the cases, but it cannot be used to reconcile
the decisions. There is no clear continuum of decreasingly vital private interests or increasingly heavy administrative burdens. In fact,
the only Maine case that boldly asserts that an administrative hear154. This raises a second spectre. If a court can avoid striking down an administrative procedure by calling it quasi-legislative (or investigative), can due process requirements be avoided by simply making the proceeding look non-judicial?
155. Fichter v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 604 A.2d at 437.
156. Id. at 438.
157. See supra note 17.
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ing requires cross-examination involves uniform rates for motor carriers. 158 Somehow, the liberty or property interest there sounds
roughly on par with the interests threatened in the cases where
cross-examination was either limited or not required at all. Recall
that Maine Clean Fuels disputed the denial of a permit to build an
oil refinery, Hale the denial of an application to open a nursing
home, and Secure Environments the refusal of an application to run
a landfill.
If we look at the dates of the cases, however, a more instructive
pattern emerges. Cole's Express, Maine's stridently pro-cross-examination statement, was decided in 1958. The more recent
cases-Maine Clean Fuels (1973), Hale (1981), Secure Environments (1988), and Fichter (1992)-show a markedly greater reluctance to impose additional procedural burdens on an administrative
agency. Ziehm then becomes slightly anomalous. Nevertheless, it
may be distinguished since the interest involved, child custody,
must rank in importance near the top of any list.
The position that workers' compensation will occupy on the continuum between minimal due process requirements and the entire
"Wigmore list"1 59 cannot be predicted with confidence.60 Nevertheless, the cases strongly indicate that the provision in the most recent
rules' 61 for depositions prior to the formal hearing should be enough
to satisfy due process. In other words, the procedure provided by the
regulations is probably "fair enough."
C. Fact-Finder
After her incarnations as investigator and expert witness, the IME
takes on her strangest role when she submits her report. Because of
the weight given to her findings, the IME rather than the hearing
officer acts as fact-finder for all practical purposes. Technically, the
IME's decision merely constitutes evidence from which a workers'
compensation hearing officer makes the ultimate ruling. Practically,
however, her decision carries such weight that the hearing officer
"ruling" looks more like judicial review than fact-finding.
This oddity was the result of an attempt to defuse the inevitable
court challenge to the new statute.162 Binding decisions by medical
panels have been struck down in other states, and the legislature
sought to avoid the same mistakes. The fact that the decisions were
binding, however, was not the constitutional infirmity in those
158. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Cole's Express, 138 A.2d at 470-71.
159. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 7.1.
160. See supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text. The Maine cases at least show
a greater degree of consistency than the U.S. Supreme Court cases, as evidenced by
Goldberg and Mathews.
161. Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.16(E) (effective Aug. 1, 1992).
162. Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2.
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There is nothing inherently unconstitutional in making the IME
the fact-finder and the hearing officer an intermediate appellate decision-maker. "Due process has never been thought to require that
the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or
administrative officer."'" In fact, our jury system is based on the
idea that the non-legal mind is preferable for fact-finding. By elevating the status of the IME to fact-finder, rather than a bizarre sort of
unchallengeable witness, the legislature could diminish the
confusion.
She, after all, functions very much like a full-fledged fact-finder.
The parties submit evidence to her, which she weighs independently
in reaching her verdict. Once her decision is made, it can only be
reversed if the record shows that clear and convincing evidence discredits her conclusion.' 65
This semantic solution, however, does not solve a more fundamental problem with the IME system. The IME is qualified and authorized to make only the medical decisions in a case. Even if we assume
that the medical and non-medical issues can be bifurcated, 10 the
system will require two sets of findings, which presumably will then
need to be meshed to produce a final decision.
Administrative/JudicialReview
The primary issue raised by the IME's exalted status centers
around the record. Binding decisions by medical panels have been
107
struck down in the past, primarily because of inadequate records.
Our legal system abhors decisions based on information not received
in evidence.' In addition to denying the parties an opportunity to
rebut that evidence, there is a second, equally important shortcoming to an incomplete record-it precludes an effective review of the
IME's decision.
In Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 6 9 the Supreme Court of Minnesota invalidated a workers' compensation statute that provided for a
163. See Part V.C., notes 167-76 and accompanying text. See also E.H. Schoplor,
Annotation, Administrative Decision or Finding Based on Evidence Secured Outside
of Hearing, and Without Presence of Interested Party or Counsel, 18 A.L.R. 2d 552,
570-71 (1951).
164. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979).
165. P.L. 1991, ch. 885 (Act effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(7)).
166. See supra note 17.
167. See Schopler, supra note 163, at 570-71.
168. "Nothing is more repugnant to Anglo-American traditions of justice than to
be at the mercy of witnesses one cannot see or challenge, or to have one's rights stand
or fall on the basis of unrevealed facts that perhaps could be explained or refuted." 3
LAmsON, supra note 35, § 79.83(a).
169. 19 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1945).
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binding report by a medical board. The statute provided for the creation of a board to "determine such medical questions raised by the
pleadings and such as are certified to it by the commission."1 7 0 After

reaching its conclusions, the board filed a report, which was required
to include the "names of the doctors who appeared... and such
medical reports and exhibits as were considered by it."' 7' The com-

missioner was required to adopt the report in his decision.7 2
The constitutional problem in Hunter stemmed from the failure
of the statute to require that the board fie a transcript of its evidence. Without this information, the court's "power to review findings of the medical board and to determine whether they are supported by sufficient foundation in fact is ... frustrated.'1
Therefore, the "claimant's right of appeal or review is effectively
denied."1 "4
Again, in Dation v. Ford Motor Co., "7 5 Michigan's highest court
struck down an essentially identical statute. The court held that the
absence of an adequate record unconstitutionally denied the parties
both the opportunity to explain or rebut the medical
board's conclu17
sions, and the opportunity for judicial review. 1
In deference to these decisions, Maine's new law tries to provide
an adequate record to allow review. 77 The report must include "a
description of findings sufficient to explain the basis of those findings.' ' 78 Taken alone, this required report would probably offend
due process in the same manner as the reports in the cases above. If
the IME's basis for her findings is the only requirement, then adverse evidence need not be included. All the evidence in the record
would support the IME's conclusion, and review would be
meaningless.
The regulations drafted by the Medical Coordinator also attempt
to provide an adequate record for review of the IME's findings.
They require that communication between the parties and the examiner be in writing and that all parties receive copies.'70 It is unclear whether this provision was intended to require that the hearing officer also receive copies. The only explicit provision defining
the contents of an IME report requires that the IME include an
itemized invoice for her bill and the information sought by the party
170. Id. at 797 n.1.
171. Id. at 797 n.3.
172. Id. at 797 n.4.
173. Id. at 799.
174. Id.
175. 22 N.W.2d 252 (Mich. 1946).
176. Id. at 258.
177. See Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2.
178. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Ma REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(5)).
179. Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.16(A) (effective Aug. 1, 1992).
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requesting the examination "in concise narrative form. ' 180 "Because
the statute prohibits consideration of evidence not considered by the
IME,'I a reasonable negative implication might be that the Legislature intended the hearing officer to review all the evidence that was
considered. These regulations, however, fail to clarify this important
point and should be rewritten by the new Maine Workers' Compensation Board. 82
Still more troubling is the section detailing how subsequent medical evidence should be handled."8 3 If the treating health care provider submits further information to the IME between the time of
the IME's report and the hearing, the IME must file a supplemental
report only if the information affects her findings. 184 This provision
threatens to exclude evidence improperly. If the new data rebuts the
IME's findings without changing her position, it will never enter the
record. Potentially, evidence that would render the IME's decision
incorrect can be ignored by the IME and withheld from the hearing
officer. "[I]f a Legislature attempts to make the findings of fact of
its agencies conclusive, even though the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have been invaded, the legislative action is invalid
'"185

VI.

CONCLUSION

The underlying policy concern during each phase of the process is
the same: Each party must have an adequate opportunity to be
heard. From the cases surveyed in this Comment, a meaningful opportunity to be heard appears to require at least the ability to present evidence, rebut adverse evidence, and to challenge it on appeal.
As the statute stands, the IME system lacks a meaningful provision
for the rebuttal of adverse evidence, and the record that it requires
for review by the hearing officer may be constitutionally deficient.
In its efforts to skirt constitutional confrontation, the Legislature
created a confusing statute, which suffers from the very problems it
sought to avoid. If the Law Court views workers' compensation benefits as vital to the individuals affected, as well they might, then the
requirements of due process could invalidate the new system. For
180. Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.16(B) (effective Aug. 1, 1992).
181. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(5)).
182. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(1)). ("The board shall develop and implement an independent medical examiner system consistent with the requirements of this section.").
183. P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at ME. Rsv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A

§

312(6)).

184. Id.
185. Dation v. Ford Motor Co., 22 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Mich. 1946) (quoting Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 16 F. Supp. 575, 585 (E.D. Va. 1936), afl'd 300 U.S.
608 (1937)).
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two reasons, however, this result seems improbable. First, the regulations implemented by the Medical Coordinator address most of
the due process concerns. 188 Second, the caselaw displays heightened
awareness of administrative burdens. At a time when the state of
Maine faces such dire financial woes, a court will not be eager to
impose further costs on an already straining government. 8"
A slight adjustment to the regulations should cure any constitutional defect in the IME system. They already provide for pre-hearing depositions which should satisfy the cross-examination concerns,
and attempt to make the evidence from each party available to the
other in time for rebuttal.18 8 They should also require that all evidence considered by the IME,including any information submitted
by the health care provider after the IME's initial report but before
the decision, be presented to the hearing officer. An adequate opportunity to rebut adverse evidence presents a greater challenge in a
paper hearing like that created by the IME system. Obviously, the
system must eventually close the presentation of evidence. Perhaps
the regulations should specifically provide a "last shot" for each
party to submit rebuttal evidence after the deadline for their primary submissions.
Since the Mathews formula invites the court to weigh the administrative burdens and the value of other procedures, the question
will remain whether the IMF system makes sense in general. Rather
than streamlining the process, it seems to have complicated it.
Rather than saving money, it appears to be spending it. The IME
system creates a new level of bureaucracy which may be hard
pressed to justify its existence.
If basic fairness to the parties required by due process includes
some requirement of common sense, the IME system stumbles here.
The Mathews formula dictates consideration of the state's interest
in controlling its administrative burden. The IMF system, however,
appears to increase that burden by assuming responsibility for medical analysis previously paid for by the private parties.' 80 Moreover,
its approach creates a new level of bureaucracy; only a legislative
mind could view that as an avenue for increased efficiency.
186. See P.L. 1991, cl. 885, § 312(4) (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Mn
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 312(4)). See supra note 143.
187. "[I]f the question presented is a novel one, if legal authority is divided, if the
statute is ambiguous, or-sometimes-if legal doctrine, though clear, is outrageous,
the reviewing court ought to be concerned with policy in the broadest sense." FRANK
M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 106 (1980).
188. Me. W.C.C. Rule 10.16 (effective Aug. 1, 1992).
189. Undoubtedly in response to the Tucker Memo, see Memorandum, supra note
8, the statute provides that the cost of the examination will be paid by the employer.
P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-8 (effective Oct. 7, 1992) (to be codified at Mn. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 39-A, § 312(5)). The cost of the examination itself, however, is only part of the
expense of the system.
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Of course, the Legislature's view of increased efficiency encompassed a broader picture than simply the administrative burden.
"Maine's system encourages an inordinate amount of litigation, protracted absences, more medical treatment, delays in return to work,
unfairness and higher costs."19 0 The larger view accounts for the loss
of productivity when a worker spends eleven months on average
resolving a claim,191 being examined by a flock of doctors along the
way (at the behest of his naturally litigious attorney). Maine's system must consider the financial burden on employers and insurers
as well as on itself.192 From a due process standpoint, of course, the
burden on the state in general does not enter the formula.
If all the procedural due process analysis can be reduced to one
test-"Is the process fair to both parties?"-then the IME system
does not suffer from any serious defects. The objections suggested
by the caselaw can be corrected easily. Unfortunately, the larger
question-whether the system is an expensive blunder-is not a
matter for judicial scrutiny. Courts may examine a statute's consti93
tutionality, but not its wisdom.1

Sean T. Carnathan

190.

GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE,

191.

Id. at 35.

supra note 2, at 20.

192. Our system is currently so expensive that insurers regularly threaten to abandon the state. See Eric Blom, McKernan Plan Would Trim Comp Benefits, PORTLAND PREss HERALD, Feb. 26, 1992, at 1A.As Governor McKernan frequently points
out, business and employment in Maine suffer when insurance costs soar. Id. Small
picture thinking leads to unfair criticism. But see Mills, supra note 3, at 3.
In a market like Maine's where the value of claims has been so substantially chopped by the legislature, it is possible for an insurer to make a
great deal of money if it simply fails to change its reserve setting policies in
response to the cut in workers' benefits. There are many indications that
this is what happened after the 1987 cuts.

Id.
193. C.f. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Constitution should not "prevent the natural outcome of a dominant [public] opinion").

